Europe is changing all the time. It is getting deeper and wider in a process that often looks confusing, but the trend is unmistakable. At this stage of our history, we are facing two challenges: widening by including most of the rest of the continent, and deepening to both perfect the existing economic arrangements and reap more benefits in largely untapped non-economic areas.
Is widening making deepening harder? For this to be the case we would need to see an increase in the costs of deepening over and beyond the benefits. There is little evidence of that. It is often believed that the real problem is that decision-making becomes more difficult with more members. This is true with the current institutions and procedures, but it does not have to be the case. This is precisely the challenge that was faced by the Convention. Its draft treaty makes a number of important proposals that stand to improve decision making and to preserve the ability for a wider Europe to become deeper as well. On the other side, progress is difficult because of the representation problem, the need for minority views to be taken on board when they are strongly held. This aspect often takes the form of the long-simmering conflict between large and small countries. But many issues often cut across national lines. What Europe misses is a Pan-European political representation of these views. This is an area where the Convention has been silent.
Introduction
In just a few years, Europe will have deeply transformed itself. With the launch of the euro in 1999, it has become much deeper. With the accession of ten new members in 2004, it will spread widely over a much wider land mass. It is no wonder, therefore, that an unprecedented Convention has been convened to mull over the changes that are required to adapt our institutions to the new configuration. The Convention's proposals are not driven by a powerful vision but by a thick web of compromises, within the Convention itself, and between the Convention and the national governments that will now decide what to do with them. To some, these proposals represent a significant step forward, to others they display Europe's tendency to crystallize current disagreements into perennial arrangements.
It is tempting, indeed, to feel that Europe is not rising up to its challenges. Would we be where we are today had the Founding Fathers displayed as much lack of courage as we now witness? Where is the vision of Jean Monnet who, in the darkest years of WW II, declared in August 1943: "There will be no peace in Europe, if the states are reconstituted on the basis of national sovereignty... The countries of Europe are too small to guarantee their peoples the necessary prosperity and social development."
This is not what happened over the subsequent 60 years, but Jean Monnet was not disappointed, for he was a patient man with a method: "Concrete and resolute action on a limited but decisive point, which provokes a fundamental change on this point and progressively modifies the actual terms of the problem as a whole" (Memorandum of 3rd May 1950).
The Jean Monnet method lives on. EMU and enlargement have already changed "the terms of the problem as a whole". And so does the Convention, and so will the InterGovernmental Conference, despite all the shortcomings that we can envision. Impatient euro-enthusiasts must coexist with frightened euro-skeptics, so we sit in the uncomfortable and imperfect middle, but the middle itself moves, albeit slowly. As an economist, I can see a trend and large fluctuations around the trend. And, true to the state of knowledge in macroeconomics, I can better explain and foresee the trend than the cyclical fluctuations. In fact, my purpose in this lecture is to apply the methods of economic analysis to interpret some current debates. I will start by recalling some general principles from the theory of fiscal federalism and then use them to argue that Europe needs to get deeper, with increasing emphasis on non-economic issues. I will then examine whether enlargement makes deepening more difficult, and provide an assessment of the draft treaty proposed by the Convention. Before concluding, I will attract attention to the conflict between large and small countries.
Task Allocation in the European Union: Principles
Do we need further deepening? This is a highly controversial issue, with strongly held views on each side. I will argue to show that these opposite views are (usually) correct but unbalanced. They fail to recognize that costs and benefits from further deepening are often finely balanced. To see that, we need a method of analysis.
The EU is not a federation but it must still deal with the same question that federal states face: how to decide at which level should particular tasks assigned? This question is more delicate than in a federal state because any transfer of sovereignty calls into question the Nation-State, the deep, intimate way in which every citizen nowadays defines his identity. It was not always that way. Not long ago, different people from different nationalities could co-exist within a state for generations. Baghdad, for instance, was home to Arabs, Jews, Turks, Persians, Kurds, Russians, and many more. Here, Vienna was at its political and cultural peak when its inhabitants were coming from all over Central Europe and the Balkans. Our prism has changed over the last couple of centuries, but it may change yet again. This is why the principles of fiscal federalism offer a good starting point when trying to think which public goods ought to remain in national hands and which ones can be shared at the European level.
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In a nutshell, benefits and costs from centralization need to be assessed and balanced. Centralization at the European level provides benefits when it provides economies of scale or scope, when there exist spillovers. The benefits come in the form of enhanced effectiveness. The costs result from information asymmetries and heterogeneity. If it is costly for the center to be well informed about local conditions, effectiveness calls for decentralization. If preferences significantly differ across localities, decentralization is required to deliver the best adapted public goods. Thus, as often with two-handed economics, we face trade-offs and we need to deal with the public goods one by one. Let me consider some of them, one by one.
Economic public goods
Much of the integration process so far has concerned economic public goods. The process of centralization is now almost complete. We do have an economic and monetary union.
Trade can be seen as a public good. It clearly displays increasing returns to scale and scope, both because it enlarges the set of producers and consumers, and because many of the traded goods are produced with increasing return technologies. Local conditions matter little since it is relative competitive advantage that matters, although transitory adjustment costs, if concentrated geographically, call for some form of Pareto transfers. Pareto transfers, however, are rarely observed in practice, which justifies some concern and transitory arrangements. Likewise, preference heterogeneities are limited, but not altogether absent as we learn from cases like beer purity laws or artistic creation. All in all, though, the case for centralizing trade is overwhelming and it is logical that this is where European integration started, and why the Common Market has come to be seen as a spectacular success.
Money too is a public good that displays strongly increasing returns to scale. Monetary policy is a source of spillovers, which used to be called beggar-thyneighbor. The Optimum Currency Area literature, on the other hand, brings up the role of heterogeneous preferences that come with low labor mobility and undiversified or limited trade openness. The case for centralizing monetary policy is less strong than in the case of trade, and this is why it has taken longer for the Single Currency to be adopted, and not everywhere.
Financial market supervision is a public good for which information asymmetries are important enough to deter centralization. But, with the single currency, the potential for returns to scale and spillovers has greatly increased. For example, in case of a banking or financial crisis, the systemic risk is now increasingly pan-European. As financial integration deepens, the trade-off is shifting in favor of centralization.
Research also displays large returns to scale and scope, and it is a source of spillovers. Heterogeneity and information asymmetries do not seem to be important, but there are important local externalities. This is so because research often results into geographical specialization in high value-added activities, a local spillover. While trade, in principle, implies that all EU members eventually benefit from strong hightech concentration in some geographical areas, investment in human capital is borne by each member country. The benefits through trade are diffuse, the costs are visible and measurable. This is why we now have some centralization at the EU level alongside national research programs. My hunch is that protectionist forces overemphasize the local spillovers and that more centralization will be needed if Europe is ever to emerge as a serious challenger to the United Sates.
Much of public spending is strictly local and, quite possibly, subject to decreasing returns, with few spillovers. Local preferences and information asymmetries are important. There is little room, therefore, for Europe-wide public spending. The exception may be public infrastructures, especially in transports, where returns to scale and spillovers are present. In this area, some partial centralization could be warranted.
Since taxes are primarily justified by the need to finance public spending, the same conclusion applies. There is much debate on tax spillovers, these days, with fears of a race to the bottom and calls for harmonization, which is close but not equivalent to centralization. So far at least, there is no evidence that such a race has happened, except maybe for the taxation of capital.
3 On the other side, high tax levels in Europe point to an opposite spillover, the collusion of Leviathan governments. This potential collusion makes tax competition desirable. All in all, the case remains open.
Finally, the discussion about labor market institutions mirrors that about taxes. The same fears about a race to the bottom affecting workers' protection lead to similar demands for harmonization. Yet, years of economic research have associated high unemployment with misguided regulation of the labor markets. In the face of strenuous resistance to reform in a number of countries, competition among regulatory systems seems the only hope of reducing unemployment.
Non-economic public goods
The provision of non-economic public goods takes us closer to the idea of a political union. Centralization has been limited so far, largely because of the presence of important information asymmetries, but mostly because of real or supposed heterogeneous preferences that reflect nationalistic sentiments.
In areas like justice or education, returns to scale are non-existent and spillovers limited while heterogeneity is large, reflecting long-held national traditions and cultures. In most federal countries, where heterogeneity is less pronounced than across European countries, these public goods are decentralized. There is no general case for centralization in justice and education. The exceptions include commercial law, which is associated with trade, higher education, which is related to research, and deep defining values such as the death penalty ban.
The case of internal security is different. The free mobility of people inside the EU "modifies the actual terms of the problem", to adopt Jean Monnet's terms. The true borders are now between the EU and the rest of the world. This is a form of spillover, which opens up the possibility of free-riding. The creation of a unique border police corps would greatly enhance the effectiveness with which the public good is delivered. Resistance again a European border police is stiff. It is partly justified by information asymmetries, but the defense of special interests also weighs heavily, a theme that will become recurrent. As national corps fear that they will lose some influence and authority, they appeal to heterogeneities of preferences: are we sure, they say, that a European corps will protect us as well as our own?
Much the same applies to external security. Defense is subject to rising returns, and spillovers are very large in a geographically compact area. A European army is certain to be more efficient than the puzzle that we now have. This is why one of Jean Monnet's first "concrete and resolute actions" was to propose the European Defence Community, which was vetoed by his own -and mine -country. Since then, very little progress has been achieved. To be sure, true preference heterogeneities exist, yet the case for centralization is strong. Vested interests are powerful, we do have a military-industrial complex.
From common defense, the distance to common foreign policy is short, and much the same applies. Real or supposed national interests make the case for centralization moot, no matter how strong it can be, and the recent history is not indicating any progress, to say the least. Here again, special interests seem to hide behind real or supposed preference heterogeneities. Real or supposed? According to the latest Eurobarometer poll, 67% of citizens favor, and 21% oppose, a common foreign policy. And 73% favor, while 17% oppose a common defense policy. Yet, it is true that the results significantly differ across countries.
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Executive powers, democratic accountability and legitimacy: the state of play Even assuming that centralization were decided where it is justified (research, external and internal security), another Pandora box would have to be opened. The delivery of non-economic public goods requires an executive with adequate political authority and subject to democratic oversight. Currently, we have two institutions that enjoy executive powers, the European Commission and the Eurosystem, and two legislative bodies: the Council and the European Parliament.
The European Commission is a hybrid, combining legislative and executive powers and subject to the kind of limited democratic accountability that typically applies to bureaucracies. As Guardian of the Treaty, it is meant to be non-political and indeed it brings together Commissioners that are not jointly supported by any majority, either in the Council or in the European Parliament. Two of them, the Competition Commissioner and the Trade Commissioner, enjoy true executive powers, a consequence of the existence of a Common Market. The other Commissioners currently act as bureaucrats acting on mandates from the Council. The two "executive Commissioners" are not subject to democratic accountability, however. At the cost of limited legitimacy, this is acceptable since their tasks are precisely defined and largely technical. Open ended tasks like foreign policy or internal security, however, require the ability to make political decisions, which can only be legitimate if they are supported by a political majority.
As a non-elected body with executive powers, the Eurosystem is a bureaucracy. It is given a precise and narrow task defined as price stability and "without prejudice to the objective of price stability … to support the general economic policies in the Community". It is nominally accountable to the European Parliament, but the parliament has no real control power. The result is a widespread perception of a "democratic deficit".
The Council decides on proposals submitted by the Commission. Decisions fall in either of two categories: unanimity, which gives each country a veto right, or qualified majority, with weights that tend to over-represent the smaller countries. I return to this question later, here I just wish to note that the Council is highly legitimate but that its democratic accountability depends on the importance voters confer to European issues at times of national elections. A rough rule of thumb is that this importance is inversely proportional to country size.
The European Parliament's powers have increased with co-decision, a process that subjects some decisions to the joint approval of the Council and of the Parliament. In theory, the Parliament should be fully legitimate and the main source of democratic accountability in the EU. In practice, it elections to the Parliament are conducted at the national level, most often based on domestic political issues. This undermines the Parliament's legitimacy. The Parliament is also divided along both party and national lines, with the result that its decisions are not always easy to understand by the citizens.
The Challenges of Deepening
A number of countries and citizens are happy to have a wider but not deeper EU. They observe that deepening has progressed far enough. In this view, even before enlargement, we had reached an equilibrium between the gains in efficiency and the costs of heterogeneity and asymmetric information. I don't agree. Let me try and convince you that some deepening is needed.
Economic Public Goods
The provision of economic public goods has now reached a degree of centralization that is close to optimal, but quite there yet. The Common Market and the Single Currency operate well, yet not perfectly well. Some of the remaining tasks include closing loopholes in the Common Market (e.g. state aids) and in the monetary union (e.g. financial regulation and supervision) or cases of excessive centralization (e.g. the Common Agricultural Policy and the Stability and Growth Pact, for which information asymmetries and preference heterogeneity have proven deep enough to reconsider existing arrangements).
Many of the other tasks that require careful thinking are currently included in the Lisbon strategy. Some of them, those that deal with labor markets and social policies are unlikely candidates for centralization as they involve limited externalities and no increasing returns, while subject to severe information asymmetries and preference heterogeneities. The exceptions concern arrangements that limit labor mobility, like unemployment and pension schemes, and higher education and research, which are next dealt with.
Non-Economic Public Goods
The next frontier of European integration lies in the provision of non-economic public goods. I will briefly consider three of them to illustrate why deepening is needed now, with or without enlargement.
Higher education and research
Higher education and research are essential to the objective of the Lisbon strategy, making Europe "the most dynamic, knowledge based economy in the world by 2010". This objective is clearly unrealistic but the intention to prevent the gap with the US from increasing further and, eventually to close it, is commendable. How is this supposed to come about? The strategy emphasizes social inclusion and the functioning of labor markets, environment protection and higher education and research. Because information asymmetries and preference heterogeneities are generally high, the Lisbon strategy does not rely on centralization, but on the "open method of coordination". The approach consists in comparing national experiments, trying to identify best practices, and exerting peer pressure on national governments so that they move towards these best practices. The open method of coordination is a waffle that attempts to square the circle, inviting joint action in areas where, I have argued earlier, competition is the proper response. The absence of any obligation, while fully justified on most issues, means that the strategy is unlikely to deliver concrete decisions.
And that is the way it should be, for competition is the default option. The main casualty is higher education and research. Europe badly trails behind the US, and suffers from the most wasteful of brain drains: many of the best teachers and researchers, trained at high costs by the free public systems of Europe, are imported free of charge by the US universities and research centers.
An analogy can be helpful, here. For the production of goods and services, the Common Market has finally put to an end the time-honored practice of nurturing national champions, an ill-conceived implication of the mostly invalid infant-industry argument. This applies to the production of knowledge as well.
The Bologna process, which aims at standardizing university curricula, is an early acknowledgement of the need to "do something". Its main advantage is to increase competition by raising the mobility students. But, with few exceptions, universities are state-owned and therefore any beneficial effect from enhanced competition is unlikely to appear soon, much as happened when industrial champions were subsidized. If the EU is ever to challenge the US in higher education, much more will have to be done, and powerful entrenched local interests will have to be confronted. Similarly, research funding remains largely national, supporting national champions that often fail to compete with the world's leaders in their fields. Some resources have been transferred at the EU level but the procedure emphasizes the development of networks. In economic terms, this means the financing of EU-wide cartels that bring together and protect uncompetitive national champions. Here again, we need Europewide competition among research centers and among funding sources.
Internal security
The four freedoms imply that internal security is no longer enforceable only at the national level. For most criminal activities, the real border is the EU border. The current arrangement is clearly inefficient, prone to free-riding. Why should, say, the Greek authorities devote large resources to policing their borders if they have reasons to believe that most crime will take place elsewhere in the EU? Cooperation exists, but it is unlikely to deal with the effectiveness problem.
External security and foreign affairs
I lump external security and foreign affairs to be brief, and because these two public goods are deeply linked. Here, as the Iraq war reminded us, increasing returns are massive. No European country alone can weigh much in world affairs while a united Europe can be a decisive voice. This seems to be well understood by most Europeans: 67% of citizens of the future EU25 are in favor of a common foreign policy, and 75% in favor of a common defense (Figures 1 and 2 ). Yet, preference heterogeneities are very sizeable, which is undoubtedly one reason why no centralization is in sight. Another reason may be the fact that the relevant national administrations are loath to see their prerogatives clipped. 
Enlargement vs. Deepening?
The impending enlargement to 25 members, with several more countries likely to join over the next decade, changes the nature of the EU. The Nice Summit has demonstrated the inability of current institutions to carry out existing tasks, making it clear that, independently of any further deepening, enlargement requires a serious overhaul. The Convention has drafted a Constitutional Treaty now under negotiation within the Inter-Governmental Conference.
Is Enlargement the problem?
Enlargement would make further deepening difficult if the new countries were to increase heterogeneities within the new EU more than they raise the returns to scale and scope. Of course, it is too early to know how the new members will act once inside the union. One limited piece of information can be gleaned from the surveys reported in Eurobarometer. A key question is: "In the near future, you see s yourself as 1) Italian; 2) Italian and European; 3) European and Italian; 4) European only", and similarly in every country. Figure 3 shows the percentages of citizens who chose the first answer, those who mainly "feel national". Among citizens of current EU member countries, 40% choose the first answer and 44% the second. Among the ten accessing countries, the corresponding returns are 33% and 54%. Averages, of course, hide large differences across countries, and this is what matters for heterogeneity. The standard deviation of the percentages that choose the first answer is 12.1% for the sample of current members, and it drops to 11.2% when the ten accessing countries are added. I am not prepared to argue that EU-25 will be less heterogeneous than EU-15, but I am pleasantly surprised by this result. I  M  LV  PL  SLO  D  E  F  LT  RO  DK  BG  CZ  EST  H  B  NL  IRL  P  A  TR  GR  S  SF  UK I am not prepared either to conclude that decision-making will be as easy -or rather not harder -after enlargement. Quite to the contrary. As already noted, Baldwin et al. (2001) show that, at unchanged distribution of preferences, the various decisionmaking procedures (current, past and futures) become more unwieldy as the number of members rises. Thus the good news (no more diversity) is turned into a bad news (more difficult decision-making) because of the voting procedures. What this all means is that a wide Europe cannot be run as the initial EU-6. Yet, any deepening will require radical changes in the decision-making approach. It is not enlargement itself that threatens deepening but the arcane decision-making process.
The draft treaty
The Convention's draft treaty represents some progress concerning decision-making in the Council, the structure of the Commission and democratic accountability. It is not as successful concerning the task allocation process and ignores the Eurosystem.
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Decision-making
The Council decides either by unanimity or by qualified majority. Under both rules, Baldwin et al. (2001) show that decision-making become more unwieldy as the number of members rises. The reason is that, with qualified majority voting, the number of coalitions than can block a decision quickly increases as the number of voters rises, and things are considerably worse for unanimous decision-making if the probability that individual countries exercise their veto rights for good (true disagreement) or bad (strategic behavior, e.g. holding-up for unrelated purposes) reasons.
Moving more items to qualified majority voting, a frequently-heard suggestion, would raise effectiveness if qualified majority voting were efficient. The Nice decision has considerably degraded the situation. The Convention's proposal -a majority of nations and 60% of people -would significantly help. Baldwin and Widgrén (2003) show that, with this proposal, the Council's decision process will not be more unwieldy than it used to be in the EU-6.
The draft treaty offers an interesting solution to the problem of a Commission whose size expands endogenously. Size does not affect decision-making since matters are settled by majority voting. Where the size matters is for administrative efficiency: surely it makes little sense to equate the number of functions with the number of member countries. By capping the number of voting Commissioners to 15, the Convention's proposal safeguards the Commission's ability to act as the EU's executive body.
Executive power requires democratic accountability. I have argued that the allocation of open-ended tasks, such as internal and external security or foreign affairs, further requires a politicization of the Commission. The draft treaty makes good progress by proposing that the President be elected by the European Parliament. The fact that the Parliament is allowed to pass a binding censure motion would lead to the required degree of politicization if the Parliament itself was operating along majority lines. This is not an issue that the Convention has tackled, a missed opportunity.
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The draft also proposes creating the position of Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, to also serve as Commission Vice-President who would be appointed and dismissed by the European Council, on qualified majority. While this makes the position of this Minister more fragile, a step needed to re-assure the Eurosceptics, it may serve as blueprint for other open-ended executive tasks.
Finally, by reinforcing the EU Parliament, the extension of co-decision improves the democratic accountability of the EU. This is also the case of the proposal that national parliaments be consulted when the principle of subsidiarity is involved.
Where the Convention has failed is to go to the end of its logic. The proposed rotation that ensures that, over time, each country has its own European Commissioner, stands in contradiction with the current principle, reaffirmed by the draft treaty, that Commissioners do not represent their countries. It is well known that this is not what happens in practice, and the treaty does not help.
The same contradiction concerns the Eurosystem. The Governing Council is the executive body and its members are formally forbidden from receiving instructions from their governments or any other public body. Yet, the one country-one personone vote rotation rule proposed by the Eurosystem stands in sharp contradiction with both its executive nature and the no-representation rule. 7 The Convention has let this proposal stand, maybe to justify its own misguided proposal. The Convention has not even revisited the consensus decision practice in the Eurosystem, in fact suggesting the same rule for the European Council. Consensus is a weak form of unanimity which is either highly inefficient if rigorously applied, or a source of manipulation and opaqueness.
Task allocation
The draft treaty makes more limited progress on the crucially important allocation of task. Where a method is needed, the draft treaty instead provides lists of exclusive and shared competence. Transfers of competences in either direction will require treaty revisions, in effect freezing current preferences.
The problem is not just that centralizing new tasks will be difficult, it is that there is no procedure for decentralizing currently centralized tasks. This is not an omission, the view that European integration is a one way process is deeply ingrained. The acquis communautaires are considered sacrosanct. This is doubly inefficient. First, it means that earlier centralization moves which are no longer needed, or were mistaken in the first place, cannot be reversed. Second, the irremediable nature of sovereignty transfers unnecessarily raises the stakes. A centralization decision that can be experimented with, and possibly reversed, is easier to agree to than a permanent one. The fear may be of an unraveling of the Union, but this seems unlikely in a draft treaty makes a sizeable contribution to realism by actually laying out the conditions and procedures for a country to leave the EU.
The treatment of foreign and security policy is puzzling. The draft treaty seems to design this area as a shared competence:
"The Union's competence in matters of common foreign and security policy shall cover all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to the Union's security, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy, which might lead to a common defence." (Article I-15-1) Yet, this area is not listed as a shared competence and further articles clearly describe a gradual process. As often in controversial matters, ambiguity is the way to achieve an agreement, but it is also a source difficulties later on. This is again one case where it would have been preferable to establish a procedure for moving tasks between the central and national levels.
The representation problem
Both centralization and increased effectiveness in voting procedures come at the expense of national sovereignty. The Convention's proposals for revamping the Council and the Commission are helpful in that regard, as is the door open to a common security and foreign policy, but they face serious opposition. One important reason is that they increase the power of the large countries. 8 As the EU expands, the relationship between the larger and smaller countries becomes more conflictual. The reason goes beyond sheer arithmetic. Enlargement means dilution, for large and small countries alike. This increases the room for a subset of countries to get together and influence decisions, not at the time of voting but upstream, when proposals are being mooted. For this influence to work, two conditions must be met: 1) there should be few countries involved for obvious effectiveness reasons; 2) these countries should still represent a significant share of votes to insure formal approval, if only by blocking alternative proposals. Dilution intensifies the need for masterminding by the larger countries, and makes it increasingly less acceptable. This is why deepening is becoming more difficult.
The problem lies with democratic control, more precisely its representation aspect. Any democracy must balance the need for effectiveness and the concern that minority views are taken on board when they are strongly held. As a democratic arrangement, the EU is badly structured to combine effectiveness and representation. Effectiveness would call for a transfer of power to a central institution, representation calls for powerful counterweights. Federal countries achieve the required balance by combining a central government with a bicameral parliament, with one chamber representing the population and the other chamber representing the constituent entities. Since the EU is not a federation, this natural solution is ruled out. What we have instead, is implicit leadership by some large countries -with several unstable possible coalitions -and veto right through unanimity decisions. Both features are highly undesirable.
While preference heterogeneity regarding the areas where deepening is needed is nonnegligible, this heterogeneity often cuts across national public opinions. The debate should therefore move from the inter-governmental forum to become truly political. This may be Europe's most delicate challenge.
To start with, we do not currently have true pan-European parties. The groupings at the European Parliament do not have such status and, even if they would be given adequate status, the incentive would be for them to remain under the shadow of national parties. These national parties may share the same name but they remain far apart on European and other issues. There are two key reasons for that. The first one is that elections to the European Parliament are conducted at the national level among domestic parties. Inevitably, these elections reflect domestic politics: at best, lip service is paid to European issues. The second reason, is that the make-up of European Parliament does not determine the political orientation of European institutions: neither the Council, nor the Commission need a political majority in the European Parliament, in fact both are non-partisan.
Closely related is the issue of democratic accountability. The Swedish referendum on the euro may reflect national fondness for the krona. More likely, it is manifestation of displeasure with the perception of "Brussels diktats". The Swedish tradition of open government is in many ways unique, but the complexity of European affairs also irritates less sensitive public opinions.
As long as we do not see changes here, national politics will dominate Europe and the representation problem will remain acute. It will continue to plague decision-making in the Council, but also the composition of the Commission and even the way the Eurosystem operates.
Conclusion
All of this may seem hopeless, but it is not. The process of European integration is unique in the world. Many regions are looking at Europe as a model, but they are intimidated by our ability to transfer significant components of national sovereignty to the central levels. Thanks for Jean Monnet and his colleagues, fifty years ago Europe has decided to shed centuries of animosity and wars, most likely for good. They were pragmatic and picked the easy-to-reach fruits first. Our generation benefits everyday from this process, but it also finds it hard to pick the far-away fruits.
Deep down, it is the Nation-State that is under siege. It remains the terms of reference for most citizens, but its power of attraction is clearly on a declining trend. The trend is very slow, of course, and it is measured in terms of generations, not years. What is also needed, is that the European institutions become seen as considerably more democratic and more mindful of national sensitivities. This is our challenge, it requires patience and dedication.
